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COMMENTS
SEARCH AND SEIZURE -WARRANT
REQUIREMENT FOR WELFARE SEARCHES*
In James v. Goldberg,1 a three-judge federal district court in
New York increased by one the lately accruing rights of that
state's welfare recipients. Relying extensively on Camara v.
MunicipaZ Court,2 the court asserted the right of privacy of a
mother receiving benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent
Children3 and imposed a search warrant requirement on case-
workers attempting to gain interviews in the homes of recipients
without the recipient's consent.
In response to a letter from her caseworker requesting a home
visit, plaintiff, a welfare recipient on AFDC and a resident of
New York City, refused to admit the caseworker to her home
under any circumstances. After an explanation that regulations
required the home visit and that refusing the visit was a ground
for termination of benefits, plaintiff remained staunch in her
refusal, though affirming a willingness to provide any desired
information at the Welfare Department's offices. Upon an
administrative hearing by the Welfare Department, a determina-
tion that such visits were mandatory and that benefits could
be conditioned upon the recipient's submission to them resulted
in the termination of benefits to plaintiff's family.4
An examination of the court's holding on these facts will show
the sound basis for the warrant requirement in administrative
law, as well as the logic of extending that requirement to the
administration of welfare. In spite of these positive steps, a look
at the court's qualification of probable cause in this field will
reveal an unnecessary compromise in the decision which can be
alleviated on review by the Supreme Court.
* James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
1. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
2. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1964) and the regulations promulgated there-
under (hereinafter called AFDC).
4. 303 F. Supp. at 938. The recent decision of Goldberg v. Kelly, 38
U.S.L.W. 4223 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1970) (No. 62), bars states from terminating
benefits unless the recipient is allowed to appear personally, have counsel,
present evidence, and confront and cross-examine witnesses. Full administra-
tive review must be at least provided by a post-termination hearing, although
a pre-termination hearing need not be judicial or quasi-judicial if full review
is had later.
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I. THE Fonmun AMENDMENT AND THE WARRANT
REQUIMMNT iN ADMInISTRATivE LAW
In terms of legal history, the recognition of fourth amendment
rights and warrant requirements in administrative law is a
recent phenomenon. In Frank v. MaryZand,5 protection against
such administrative inspections and intrusions was considered
peripheral at most to the constitutional guaranty of privacy.
Justice Frankfurter drew a line between searches for evidence
of criminal activity and purely administrative searches, applying
the right of privacy only to the former; consequently, no war-
rant requirement was introduced in the public health area.
The Frank doctrine was rejected eight years later in Camara,
which announced a warrant requirement and a standard of
probable cause for the issue of those warrants.0 With the express
overruling of Frank, the Camara Court extended the traditional
bounds of the fourth amendment and took a stand to uphold the
individual's right of privacy in other areas where official intru-
sion was accepted procedure. Recent decisions favoring the gen-
erally disenfranchised welfare recipient made the welfare search
among the logical areas of application for Camaras pronounce-
ment.
II. THE EMERGING RIGHTS OF WE FARE RECIPMWTS-
A PRELuDE To JAMES
James is not a mere restatement of a status which people re-
ceiving public assistance already enjoy. It is characteristic of a
recent trend of decisions giving this dependent class of our
society the rights which other citizens presently enjoy.
Three Supreme Court cases illustrate this trend. Sherbert v.
Verner7 held that a state may not constitutionally condition
eligibility for receipt of unemployment compensation upon the
relinquishment of first amendment freedom of religion, either
directly, or more importantly, indirectly. Abolition of the "sub-
stitute father rule," which required termination of AFDC bene-
fits to children in a family where the mother was cohabiting
with a man not their father, came via King v. Smith." The
5. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
6. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The impact and shortcomings of the Camara
decision will be discussed later as a force in molding the James holding.
7. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Plaintiff was a Seventh Day Adventist who re-
fused Saturday employment since that was her day of worship. Her refusal
resulted in termination of unemployment compensation benefits, a predicament
which effectively made her choose between her religious tenets and a state-
granted benefit to those without work.
8. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
[Vol. 22
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Supreme Court found that the word "parent" in section 406(a)
of the Social Security Act 9 was intended to mean one who has a
legal obligation to support a child. Since a "substitute father"
had no such legal obligation, termination of benefits due to the
substitute father's presence was inconsistent with the right to re-
ceive benefits under the Act for which the children were other-
wise qualified. Thus, the rule was deemed void. In Shapiro V.
Thompson,'0 a one year residency requirment was found to
infringe on the fundamental right to travel, and no compelling
state interest was produced to justify the encroachment."
In addition, regulations have been formulated to protect the
rights of the welfare recipient as a matter of national policy.
Section 2220 of the HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Ad-
ministration2 requires states to provide plans which protect
individual rights "and will not result in practices that violate
the individual's privacy or personal dignity, or harass him, or
violate his constitutional rights."'3 Subsequently, section 2230
specifically cautions against entering homes "by force or with-
out permission," visiting "outside working hours" or "during
sleeping hours," or "searching [for] clues to possible decep-
tion." 4 All of these cases and regulations provided the district
court a foundation upon which to base the James reasoning as
well as affording solid grounds for future affirmance by the
Supreme Court on appeal.' 5
III. Tm JAmms Opmiox
A. The Search Warrant Requirement
Absent effective consent, a search warrant is necessary to gain
entrance to the recipient's home. The cornerstone of this state-
9. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964). Section 606(a)(1) defines a "dependent
child" as one who is needy and
* . . who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason
of the death, continued absence from home, or physical or mental
incapacity of a parent, and who is living with [one of certain
specified relatives in the relative's home]. Id. (emphasis added.)
10. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
11. Id. Limitation of welfare expenditures and minimization of fraudulent
payments were considered permissible state goals, but not compelling state
interests under the "special scrutiny" test of the equal protection clause in the
fourteenth amendment
12. U.S.DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, U.S. DEI'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE'S HANDOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
Part IV at § 2220 (1967).
13. Id.
14. Id. at § 2230.
15. The Supreme Court has accepted the case to be decided probably next
term; cert. granted, 38 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970) (No. 977).
1970]
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ment originates in the criminal law which has applied the fourth
amendment to govern "all intrusions by agents of the public
upon personal privacy and security." 6 Encompassing adminis-
trative procedure in one category, the James court draws an
analogy to Camara and acknowledges that, although administra-
tive searches may be "less hostile" intrusions, they are nonethe-
less 'searches' within the meaning of the fourth amendment.17
However broad such a conclusion may seem, it cannot be called
unsound. The California state court in Parrish v. Civil Service
Oommissios'8 recognized this and denounced the most repugnant
type of search-the pre-dawn raid to ferret out undeclared heads
of families or illicit cohabitation in the homes of welfare re-
cipients, which could be a basis for termination of benefits. It
is to prevent abuses such as this that James correctly extends
fourth amendment protection to the recipient.
It may be argued, as it was in James,19 that a mere home visit
by the caseworker is only an offer of aid or counsel to the
recipient to promote the economic spending of what is likely to
be a meager allowance. Perhaps a certain personal rapport is
beneficial to the recipient in helping her define and solve her
financial, social, or medical problems. But as the James court
recognizes, 20 it seems impossible to divorce these helpful services
from the investigative element inherent in any home interview.
With any entrance into a home, the caseworker must necessarily
notice the presence of new furnishings, appliances, or anything
else indicative of an undisclosed source of income to the re-
cipient, and under New York law,21 the worker is bound to
report it.
In asking that welfare recipients be made an exception to
fourth amendment protection, the defendants asserted two rea-
sons: (1) welfare is a privilege, not a right; and (2) compelling
d6. 303 F. Supp. at 940. The court cites throughout the opinion many fourth
amendment cases which lend support to this general conclusion, e.g., Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Abel
v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
17. 303 F. Supp. at 941.
18. 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
19. 303 F. Supp. at 939.
20. Id. at 944.
21. N.Y. SocIAL WELF~aR LAW § 145 (McKinney 1966). This statute pro-
vides a penalty for fraudulent procurement of public assistance and concludes:
Whenever a public welfare official has reason to believe that any
person has violated any provision of this section, he shall refer the
facts and evidence available to him to the appropriate district
attorney or other prosecuting official.
[Vol. 22
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state interests outweigh the recipient's right of privacy.22 The
mere fact that welfare may be a privilege and not a right begs
the question of the state's second assertion, since even a privilege
cannot be conditioned upon the relinquishment of a constitu-
tional guarantee absent some showing of a compelling state
interest therefor.23 The crux of New York's state interest argu-
ment, minimization of fraudulent payments, 24 would seem to be
a settled issue even at the Supreme Court level because of the
Shapiro2 5 decision, and would, therefore, appear to be invalid.
The court's ruling here seems very sound especially in light of
the simple and easily accessible alternative sources of informa-
tion.
2 6
B. The Standard of Probable Cause
The mere requirement of a warrant as precedent to the case-
worker's visit leaves in limbo the basic fourth amendment
mandate that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause
.... -27 Traditional probable cause has been defined in various
ways; probably the most representative statement comes, as
follows, from Berger v. New York :21
P]robable cause under the Fourth Amendment exists
where the facts and circumstances within the affiant's
knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy
information, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant
a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense
has been or is being committed.
29
Though the "facts and circumstances," the "affiant's knowledge,"
and the "reasonably trustworthy information" have all been
22. The possibility that state policy considerations may have no place in a
balancing process against fourth amendment rights will be discussed below.
23. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963).
24. See 303 F. Supp. at 939, 942.
25. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
26. 303 F. Supp. at 943. The court, in note 13 of its opinion, refers to
the proposed declaration system of HEW [Dep't of HEW, Determination of
Eligibility for Public Assistance Programs, 33 Fed. Reg. 17189 (1968)], with
only spot checks on credibility. This parallels the present income tax return
procedure and seems to place certain aspects of national policy in opposition
to the welfare visits contested in James. Also, President Nixon in his welfare
proposals has asked for a declaration system "with demeaning and costly
investigations replaced by simplified reviews and spot checks .... " (115
CONG. Rac. H7239, S982 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1969).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
28. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967). See Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
29. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 55.
1970]
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questioned,80 a certain particularity regarding both the crime
and the evidence to be seized has been required for probable
cause to exist, with a lack of particularization rendering the
warrant invalid."'
Camara, while instituting the administrative warrant, pro-
ceeded to compromise the heretofore accepted criteria of proba-
ble cause.32 Suddenly, probable cause in the administrative
warrant was a balancing process which considered "the munici-
pal program being enforced,... the passage of time, the nature
of the building, . . . or the condition of the entire area .... "83
It would no longer "necessarily depend upon specific knowledge
of the condition of the particular dwelling. 3 4 Or more broadly,
"[i] f a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated,
then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search
warrant."38
Since James relied on Camara as precedent, it chose to follow
the questionable qualification of probable cause. According to
James, a judicial officer must
test the particular decision to search against the consti-
tutional mandate of reasonableness. Should this official
determine that a valid public interest justifies the in-
trusion contemplated, then there exists probable cause
to issue a suitably restricted search warrant.38
The departures from the Berger standard quoted above are
patent, the most obvious being the terms "reasonableness" and
"valid public interest." Both imply that in order to give gov-
ernment optimum policing of welfare expenditures, traditional
probable cause must be sacrificed. This is because welfare
searches are considered less hostile intrusions than searches
for evidence of a crime. Similar approaches in the criminal
30. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) ; Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959) ; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
31. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964).
32. LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: the
Camara and See Cases, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (1967). LaFave states:
To say that probable cause required by the Fourth Amendment is
not a fixed test, but instead involves a sort of calculus incorporat-
ing all the surrounding circumstances of the intended search,
constitutes a major departure from existing constitutional doctrine.
Id. at 12-13.
33. Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 539.
36. 303 F. Supp. at 944.
[Vol. 22
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law have been rejected. "[I]nstead we are committed to a
philosophy of tolerating a certain level of undetected crime as
preferable to an oppressive police state."3 7 Precedent shows that
the basic function of the fourth amendment is to protect personal
privacy and should not fluctuate depending on whether the
victim of the search is sought on criminal grounds rather than
for housing code violations or welfare eligibility infractions.
The danger implicit in decisions like James and Camara is an
erosion of probable cause in other areas. First, in a system where
the same judicial officer, e.g., a magistrate, is charged with
issuing all kinds of warrants, it is practically inevitable that
separate standards of probable cause in separate areas will not
long remain completely distinguishable. Nor is the safeguard of
higher judicial review a sufficient check, for constant review of
both standards, administrative and criminal, can only result in
merger at the appellate level as well. Probable cause in the end
would yield to the proverbial "rubber stamp" process. An even
more dangerous result would be a conscious formulation of
different standards. Perhaps more serious crimes and more ex-
pensive crimes would require a less quantum of evidence for
search since public interest (and opinion) would run higher in
such offenses. Only the individual's interest remains constant
regardless of the offense and its seriousness; so only protection
of the individual's interest offers a firm basis for a meaningful
standard of probable cause. Only the traditional standard, of
which Berger is representative, has individual interest as its
base, and as such, should remain unchanged.
IV. ALTR,-ATIS
On review, there are two possible grounds for adopting the
more stringent probable cause standard. First, it is possible that
welfare visits can never be completely divorced from possible
criminal prosecution. As discussed above, the senses of the
caseworker must necessarily perceive evidence of extra income
in a home, and at some point prosecution for fraud must be
considered.38 This ubiquitous criminal element suggests that
37. LaFave, mpra n.32 at 14. Decisions like Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), are not susceptible to any reasonable interpretation other
than a built-in bias in our judicial system of respect for individual rights.
38. Even if the only sanction was termination of benefits, there still remains
the matter of restitution of money fraudulently obtained which inevitably leads
to some threat of prosecution. In contrast is the housing code violation of
Camara. It is possible to follow various punitive routes such as fines or tax
assessments to ultimate eviction or public sale without criminal prosecution, and
even though it remains a possibility, prosecution is simply a more remote
possibility in the housing code area.
1970]
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only the criminal standard is applicable and therefore must be
used. Second, the welfare violation tends to be more of an in-
dividual or private offense. It reduces itself to a matter of one
person obtaining money to which he is not entitled. On the
other hand, the housing code violation has more threat of
immediate public danger such as disease, fire, or personal in-
jury.39 This distinction is closely related to the "area" nature
of housing code enforcement vis-A-vis individual scrutiny in
welfare.
Finally, should the administrative standard be adopted, cer-
tain procedural safeguards should be introduced to compensate
for the compromise of specificity and particularization in the
warrant procedure. First, since the recipient's consent is of less
importance under this procedure, 40 a higher level determination
of the reasonableness of the intrusion should be made prior to
the visit,41 by the customary judicial officer. The value of this
step would be to cut out essentially useless visits to which the
recipient must submit; and conversely, authorized visits would
necessarily rest on grounds of some importance or benefit to
the recipient. A second criteria would require advance notice of
a visit to a recipient.42 If visits are not for the purpose of dis-
covering fraud,43 this should work no hardship on the case-
worker. Further, one should be allowed some notice in order
to prepare his home for public review and to safeguard personal
matters. Third, as a policy matter, visits should be made only
upon request, except where the exigency of the situation dictates
otherwise.44 From the welfare department's point of view, this
is no great burden since most pertinent information can be
gathered elsewhere. For example, the well-being of a child could
be assured through periodic medical examinations made availa-
39, Undeniably, this is a countervailing consideration of public interest, but
nevertheless represents one more distinction between Camara and James.
40. Nothing is gained by refusal, since the caseworker could obtain a
warrant much more easily. See LaFave, supra n.29 at 23.
41. Note, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YAE L.J.
521, 530-31 (1968).
42. Id. at 533.
43. See 303 F. Supp. at 939, citing Memorandum of Law in Behalf of De-
fendant Wyman, dated June 26, 1969 at 5. Defendants' second contention was
that visits were for counselling and making available certain social services,
not for searches.
44. The emergency situation is, of course, an existing exception to the
search warrant requirement in any circumstance, and is recognized in James.
See James, 303 F. Supp. at 943, citing, e.g., in support of this conclusion Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ; and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
[Vol. 22
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ble to the AFDC mother.45 Regularity of school attendance is
another source of information concerning the child.46
V. CoxcLrusio
James has the potential to expand the rights of welfare re-
cipients on a nationwide scale, and there is no sound logic in
denying this class of people a right enjoyed by the rest of the
population. It is unfortunate that a compromise of traditional
probable cause was thought necessary before recipients could be
vested with fourth amendment protection. Higher review affords
a last chance for averting this unnecessary result and checking
what may begin an erosion of the warrant procedure in other
areas.
S. JAMMON KST0MBA , III
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